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1 General background
In the last decades various axiomatic theories of truth have been proposed
in the literature.1 One of the main research topics in the area has been that
of assessing their strength. Ideally, such an assessment should permit us to
compare theories, that is, to answer questions of the form ‘Is a theory Th1
stronger or weaker than Th2?’. However, such comparisons are not always
straightforward and in some cases even the measure of strength to be used
is not obvious at all.
The simplest comparisons can be carried out in terms of inclusion. Thus,
we can say that Th2 is not weaker than Th1 iff Th1 ⊆ Th2 (Th2 is strictly
stronger than Th1 if the inclusion is proper).
2 This, however, is a crude
measure, as it does not permit us to compare theories for which no such
simple inclusions hold.
Axiomatic theories of truth discussed in the literature are often built
over some arithmetical base theory playing the role of the theory of syntax.
Such a perspective will be adopted also in this paper: all the truth theories
which we discuss will be obtained by extending Peano arithmetic with some
axioms employing the new predicate ‘T (x)’ (the truth predicate). In view
of this, another useful measure of strength, often discussed in the literature,
is provided by comparing sets of arithmetical consequences of theories. In
1See (Halbach, 2011) for a comprehensive presentation.
2For example, it can be easily verified that UTB is strictly stronger in this sense than
TB. Both TB and UTB are disquotational truth theories; for the exact definitions, see
(Halbach, 2011, p. 53-54). For the discussion of the strength of disquotational theories,
see also (Cieśliński, 2015).
1
effect, when employing it, we compare not truth theories taken as wholes but
their arithmetical content only. From this point of view, for example, the
classical compositional typed truth theory CT− turns out to be equally strong
as UTB, since both theories have exactly the same arithmetical consequences
even though their truth axioms are quite different.3
A still subtler measure of strength has been proposed by Fujimoto (2010),
who introduced the following notion of relative truth-definability.
Definition 1 Let Th1 and Th2 be theories in one and the same language LT
containing the predicate ‘T (x)’ called ‘the truth predicate’. We say that Th1
is relatively truth-definable in Th2 (or Th2 defines the truth predicate of Th1)
iff there is a formula θ(x) ∈ LT such that for every ψ ∈ LT , if Th1 ⊢ ψ, then
Th2 ⊢ ψ(θ(x)/T (x)).
The expression ‘ψ(θ(x)/T (x))’ stands for the result of substituting the for-
mula θ for all the occurrences of ‘T ’ in ψ.
It is easy to observe that if Th2 defines the truth predicate of Th1, then
Th2 is arithmetically at least as strong as Th1. However, truth-definability is
a stricter relation and it gives us more than mere comparisons of arithmetical
strength. When employing the notion of truth-definability, we take into
account not only the arithmetical, but also the truth-theoretic content
of theories. Indeed, if Th2 defines the truth predicate of Th1, then Th2
contains the resources permitting us to reproduce the very notion of truth
characterised by the axioms of Th1. In effect, we can claim that in such
a case Th2 is at least as strong as Th1 not just arithmetically but also
conceptually.
The aim of this paper is to compare the conceptual strength of two ax-
iomatic theories of truth. The first of these is KF - a theory designed to
capture Kripke’s fixed-point model construction based on the Strong Kleene
evaluation schema. The second theory is WKF , which closely resembles
KF , except that it is designed to capture the fixed-point construction based
on the Weak Kleene evaluation schema. We assume that both theories are
formulated in the language LT , which is obtained from the arithmetical lan-
guage by adding a new one-place predicate ‘T (x)’.4 Both theories contain
Peano arithmetic (PA) together with induction for the full language with
the truth predicate.
3Namely, both of them are conservative over Peano arithmetic. For the definition of
CT− and its conservativity over PA, see (Cieśliński, 2017, p. 107ff) (the proof presented
there is an adaptation of the construction of Enayat and Visser (2015)).
4For a fuller discussion of the resources of the arithmetical part of LT , we refer the
reader to the final paragraphs of Section 2.
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For the list of axioms of KF , the reader is referred to (Halbach, 2011, p.
201); following Halbach, we will denote them as kf1–kf13. Before defining
the set of axioms of WKF , we adopt the following abbreviations.
• SentLT is the set of sentences of LT .
• Let ϕ ∈ SentLT . Then ‘D(ϕ)’ (‘x is determined’) is the formula:
‘T (ϕ) ∨ T (¬ϕ)’.
• Let ϕ(x) be a formula of LT with one variable free. Then ‘D(ϕ(x))’ is
the formula: ‘∀x
[
T (ϕ(x)) ∨ T (¬ϕ(x))
]
’.
• The expression ‘D(ϕ, ψ)’ abbreviates ‘D(ϕ) ∧D(ψ)’.
In Weak Kleene logic a compound formula will have a determinate truth
value (truth or falsity) only if its constituents are also determined. This
insight gives rise to the following axiomatisation of the truth theory WKF ,
based on Weak Kleene logic.
Definition 2 Axioms wkf1–wkf4, wkf7–wkf8 and wkf11–wkf13 of
WKF are exactly the same as kf1–kf4, kf7–kf8 and kf11–kf13; see
(Halbach, 2011, p. 201). We list below only those axioms of WKF which
differ from the corresponding axioms of KF .
wkf5 ∀ϕ, ψ ∈ SentLT
[
T
(
¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)
)
≡
(
D(ϕ, ψ) ∧ (T (¬ϕ) ∨ T (¬ψ))
)]
wkf6 ∀ϕ, ψ ∈ SentLT
[
T (ϕ ∨ ψ) ≡
(
D(ϕ, ψ) ∧ (T (ϕ) ∨ T (ψ))
)]
wkf9 ∀ϕ(x) ∈ LT∀v ∈ V ar
[
T (¬∀vϕ(v)) ≡
(
D(ϕ(x)) ∧ ∃tT (¬ϕ(t))
)]
wkf10 ∀ϕ(x) ∈ LT∀v ∈ V ar
[
T (∃vϕ(v)) ≡
(
D(ϕ(x)) ∧ ∃tT (ϕ(t))
)]
2 State-of-the-art and motivations
Theories of truth based on Weak Kleene logic have been investigated in
the literature from two angles. One important source is the paper of
Cain and Damnjanovic (1991), which describes some striking differences be-
tween the Strong Kleene and the Weak Kleene evaluation schemata in
Kripke’s model-theoretic constructions (the paper does not discuss axiomatic
truth theories). Another key source is (Fujimoto, 2010), where the discus-
sion focuses on axiomatic theories of truth, with several results about WKF
being presented.
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Starting from the model-theoretic approach, below we sketch the well-
known constructions which KF and WKF have been designed to capture.
In what follows Q ∈ {∃, ∀} and ◦ ∈ {∧,∨}. The expression ‘Qd’ (‘◦d’) stands
for the dual quantifier (dual binary connective): Qd is ∃ if Q is the universal
quantifier and it is the universal quantifier otherwise (similarly, ◦d is either
∧ or ∨ depending on what ◦ is). Tmc is the set of constant terms. The next
two definitions characterise the notions of Strong Kleene and Weak Kleene
Kripke’s jump.
Definition 3 (Strong Kleene Jump) Let S ⊆ ω. We define:
JSK(S) = {pt = sq : val(t) = val(s)}
∪ {pt 6= sq : val(t) 6= val(s)}
∪ {pT (t)q : val(t) ∈ S}
∪ {p¬T (t)q : ¬val(t) ∈ S ∨ ¬SentLT (val(t))}
∪ {pϕ ◦ ψq : ϕ ∈ S ◦ ψ ∈ S}
∪ {p¬(ϕ ◦ ψ)q : ¬ϕ ∈ S ◦d ¬ψ ∈ S}
∪ {pQvϕq : Qt ∈ Tmc(ϕ(t) ∈ S)}
∪ {p¬Qvϕq : Qdt ∈ Tm
c(¬ϕ(t) ∈ S)}.
For a set S ⊆ ω and ϕ ∈ SentLT , let ‘D(S, ϕ)’ (‘ϕ is determined in S’) be a
shorthand for: ‘ϕ ∈ S ∨ ¬ϕ ∈ S’. For a formula ϕ(x) with at most one free
variable let ‘D(S, ϕ(x))’ abbreviate ‘∀t ∈ Tmc(ϕ(t) ∈ S ∨ ¬ϕ(t) ∈ S)’. We
will use also the expression ‘D(S, ϕ, ψ)’ as a shorthand for ‘D(S, ϕ)∧D(S, ψ)’.
Definition 4 (Weak Kleene Jump)
JWK(S) = {pt = sq : val(t) = val(s)}
∪ {pt 6= sq : val(t) 6= val(s)}
∪ {pT (t)q : val(t) ∈ S}
∪ {p¬T (t)q : ¬val(t) ∈ S ∨ ¬SentLT (val(t))}
∪ {pϕ ◦ ψq : D(S, ϕ, ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∈ S ◦ ψ ∈ S)}
∪ {p¬(ϕ ◦ ψ)q : D(S, ϕ, ψ) ∧ (¬ϕ ∈ S ◦d ¬ψ ∈ S)}
∪ {pQvϕq : D(S, ϕ(v)) ∧Qt ∈ Tmc(ϕ(t) ∈ S)}
∪ {p¬Qvϕq : D(S, ϕ(v)) ∧Qdt ∈ Tm
c(¬ϕ(t) ∈ S)}.
Employing the jump operations, Weak Kleene and Strong Kleene fixed-point
models can be now defined in the following way.
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Definition 5 Let E be either Weak Kleene or Strong Kleene evaluation
scheme (that is, ‘E’ is either ‘WK’ or ‘SK’). We define:
• TE0 = Th(N) = the set of aritmetical sentences true in N (the standard
model of arithmetic),
• TEα+1 = J
E(TEα ),
• TEλ =
⋃
α<λ
TEα ,
• TE is TEκ for the least κ such that T
E
κ = T
E
κ+1.
In effect, (N, T SK) and (N, TWK) are the least fixed-point models based on
Strong Kleene andWeak Kleene logic. They are also models for the axiomatic
theories KF and WKF , respectively.
Below we introduce one additional piece of notation.
Definition 6 Let E be either Weak Kleene or Strong Kleene evaluation
scheme. We define ClOrd(N,TE) (the closure ordinal of (N, T
E)) as the least
κ such that TEκ = T
E
κ+1.
It transpires that, although similar, both constructions differ in some
important respects. In particular, closure ordinals of Weak and Strong Kleene
model-theoretic constructions can be different.
Theorem 7
(a) ClOrd(N,TSK) = ω
CK
1 ,
(b) ClOrd(N,TWK) can be ω or ω
CK
1 or infinitely many ordinals in between.
Part (a) is due to Kripke (1975); part (b) is due to Cain and Damnjanovic
(1991). As observed by Cain and Damnjanovic, the closure ordinal of Weak
Kleene model-theoretic construction depends both on the choice of coding
and on the choice of the arithmetical language (namely, on the availability
of the function symbols). To be more exact, if our arithmetical language is
that of Peano arithmetic (with only the symbols for addition, multiplication,
successor and 0 available), the closure ordinal will depend on the choice of
coding. On the other hand, if our arithmetical language contains a function
symbol for every primitive recursive function, then (independently of coding)
the closure ordinal will be ωCK1 .
5
5See also (Speranski, 2017), where it is demonstrated that expanding the language of
Peano arithmetic with the function symbol for subtraction already guarantees that the
Weak Kleene fixed-point is reached at ωCK1 .
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What is the impact of these non-absoluteness phenomena on axiomatic
theories of truth? So far this question has received very little attention in
the literature, although some partial answers have been given by Fujimoto
(2010). In this context, let us mention two important results from Fujimoto’s
paper.
Firstly, Theorem 50 (2) on p. 35 of the quoted paper establishes that
WKF and KF have the same arithmetical consequences.6 However, the re-
sult comes with an important limitation: Fujimoto assumes that the truth
axioms of WKF are added to Peano arithmetic as formulated in the lan-
guage of primitive recursive arithmetic (indeed, the availability of terms for
primitive recursive functions is employed in the proof of Fujimoto’s theorem).
As we have seen, the choice of coding and language influences the properties
of model-theoretic constructions based on Weak Kleene logic. It would be
interesting to know whether (and how) these non-absoluteness phenomena
influence the arithmetical strength of Weak Kleene truth axioms. At present
we are not aware of any results in this direction.
Secondly, Theorem 50 (1) on p. 35 establishes that KF can define the
truth predicate of WKF . This positive result does not depend on the choice
of coding and language. Whatever choices are made in this respect, there
will be a formula defining in KF the truth predicate satisfying the Weak
Kleene axioms.
However, it has been an open question whether WKF can define the
truth predicate of KF .7 It has been also far from clear whether the unique
answer to this question exists. It could happen, after all, that some versions
of WKF (say, one built over the language of primitive recursive arithmetic)
define the truth predicate of KF , while others do not.
Here we are going to demonstrate that the above question has the absolute
negative answer. This follows immediately from Theorem 14, which is the
main result of this paper. The upshot is that no matter how coding/language
is chosen, WKF does not define the truth predicate of KF . Accordingly,
throughout the paper we will simply assume that the arithmetical part of LT
6Namely, it is demonstrated that the proof-theoretic strength of both theories is that
of RA<ǫ0 , that is, of ramified analysis up to ǫ0.
7See also (Halbach, 2011, p. 263), where this question is explicitly stated as open.
So far, the only examples suggesting that Weak Kleene based theories of truth may re-
ally be weaker than their Strong Kleene counterparts come from the analysis of typed
and non-inductive versions of KF and WKF , denoted respectively as PT− and WPT−
(the theories resembling KF and WKF , except that their axioms characterise truth for
arithmetical sentences only and they do not contain induction for formulas with the truth
predicate). Namely, in (Łełyk and Wcisło, 2018) it has been demonstrated that the theory
PT− + INT , extending PT− with the axiom of internal induction, is not truth definable
in WPT− + INT .
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(the language of both KF and WKF ) is fixed without stipulating what sort
of terms for primitive recursive functions it contains. The coding will be also
treated as fixed but arbitrary. Nevertheless, Cain’s and Damnjanovic’s result
on closure ordinals will play an essential role in the proof to be presented.
3 Preliminaries
This section describes a few miscellaneous observations and results which will
be useful to us later on in this paper.
We start by defining a notion of a diagonal formula. In what follows
s is a numeral denoting a number s. Expressions ‘x = name(y)’ and
‘x = sub(y, z, s)’ are arithmetical formulas representing in PA the recur-
sive relations ‘x is a numeral denoting y’ and ‘x is the result of substituting
(a term) s for (a variable) z in (a formula) y’.
Definition 8 Let ϕ(x1 . . . xn, y) be an arbitrary formula of LT . We say that
ψ(x1 . . . xn) is the diagonal formula for ϕ(x1 . . . xn, y) if it is constructed in
the following manner:
• Denote by F (x1 . . . xn, y) the formula ‘∃ab[a = name(y) ∧ b =
sub(y, pyq, a) ∧ ϕ(x1 . . . xn, b)]’,
• Let m be the Gödel number of F (x1 . . . xn, y),
• Define ψ(x1 . . . xn) as F (x1 . . . xn, m).
It is a well-known fact that the equivalence of ψ(x1 . . . xn) with
ϕ(x1 . . . xn, pψ(x1 . . . xn)q) is provable already in PA as formulated in LT
(the acronym PAT will be used here for this theory).8 The next lemma
states that the equivalence remains provable (in KF ) after the truth predi-
cate is applied on both sides.
Lemma 9 Let ψ(x1 . . . xn) be the diagonal formula for ϕ(x1 . . . xn, y). Then:
(a) KF ⊢ T
(
ψ(x1 . . . xn)
)
≡ T
(
ϕ(x1 . . . xn, pψ(x1 . . . xn)q)
)
,
(b) KF ⊢ T
(
¬ψ(x1 . . . xn)
)
≡ T
(
¬ϕ(x1 . . . xn, pψ(x1 . . . xn)q)
)
.
8Since by assumption ϕ(x1 . . . xn, y) is an arbitrary formula of LT , the language of PA
needs to be extended. However, in order to obtain the equivalence in question it is enough
to assume that the predicate ‘T (x)’ appears only in the logical axioms of our theory. This
is exactly what we mean by ‘PA as formulated in LT ’.
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Proof. The assumption that ψ(x1 . . . xn) is the diagonal formula provides
us with an exact information about its form.9 For (b), fixing x1 . . . xn we
observe that the following conditions are provably equivalent in KF :
1. T
(
¬ψ(x1 . . . xn)
)
,
2. T
(
¬F (x1 . . . xn, m)
)
,
3. ∀ab[a = name(m) ∧ b = sub(m, pyq, a)→ T
(
¬ϕ(x1 . . . xn, b)
)
],
4. T
(
¬ϕ(x1 . . . xn, pF (x1 . . . xn, m)q)
)
,
5. T
(
¬ϕ(x1 . . . xn, pψ(x1 . . . xn)q)
)
.
The equivalence of 1 and 2 holds by the definition of ψ; the second equivalence
holds by the axiom of KF for negated existential statements and the fact
that provably in KF , we have full disquotation for arithmetical formulas.
The third equivalence holds because, provably in PA, ∀ab[a = name(m)∧b =
sub(m, pyq, a) → b = pF (x1 . . . xn, m)q]. The last equivalence holds by the
definition of ψ.
Part (a) is proved in a very similar manner. 
The following observation will be also useful.
Observation 10 Let τ(x) be a KF truth predicate in (N, TWK). For ψ ∈
SentLT , denote by ψ
τ the result of replacing all occurrences of ‘T (t)’ by ‘τ(t)’
in ψ. Then for every positive sentence ψ ∈ LT :
10
(N, TWK) |= τ(ψ) ≡ ψτ .
The proof is a minor modification of the familiar reasoning showing that
KF proves disquotation for positive formulas. For more details, see (Halbach,
2011, p. 201).
The next definition introduces the notion of a grounded sentence.
Definition 11 Let E be either Weak Kleene or Strong Kleene evaluation
scheme. We say that a sentence ψ ∈ LT is E-grounded iff either ψ or ¬ψ
belongs to TE.
9Indeed, this piece of information is absolutely crucial. Observe that for Lemma 9
it is not enough to assume that ψ(x1 . . . xn) is provably equivalent (even in PAT ) to
ϕ(x1 . . . xn, pψ(x1 . . . xn)q). Thus, for an arbitrary sentence ϕ, PAT ⊢ (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) ≡ 0 = 0.
Still, for many sentences ϕ (those lacking a determinate truth value) it will not be the
case that KF ⊢ T (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) ≡ T (0 = 0).
10A positive sentence is defined as a sentence in which every occurrence of ‘T ’ lies in
the scope of even number of negations.
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We state now the following fact.
Fact 12
(i) For every ψ ∈ LT , if ψ ∈ T
WK, then ψ ∈ T SK,11
(ii) For every ψ ∈ LT , if ψ ∈ T
SK, then for every T ⊆ N (if (N, T ) |= KF ,
then ψ ∈ T ),
(iii) For every T ⊆ N
(
if (N, T ) |= KF , then ¬∃ψ(ψ is SK-grounded and
ψ ∈ T and ¬ψ ∈ T )
)
.
Part (i) can be easily proved by ordinal induction. Parts (ii) and (iii) are
well-known.
Fact 12 permits us to derive the following useful corollary.
Corollary 13 If τ(x) is a KF truth predicate in (N, TWK), then for every
WK-grounded sentence ψ ∈ LT :
(N, TWK) |= τ(ψ) ≡ T (ψ).
Proof. Define T as {x : (N, TWK) |= τ(x)}. Given that τ(x) is a KF
truth predicate in (N, TWK), it is easy to observe that (N, T ) |= KF . Fixing
an arbitrary WK-grounded ψ, our task is to show that (N, TWK) |= τ(ψ) ≡
T (ψ). Note that since ψ is WK-grounded, it is also SK-grounded by Fact
12(i).
For the implication from left to right, assume that (N, TWK) |= τ(ψ), so
(N, T ) |= T (ψ) by the definition of T . Assuming for the indirect proof that
(N, TWK) |= ¬T (ψ), we obtain: (N, TWK) |= T (¬ψ) because ψ is grounded.
Therefore by Fact 12(i) (N, T SK) |= T (¬ψ) and so (N, T ) |= T (¬ψ) by Fact
12(ii). In effect, both ψ and ¬ψ belong to T . However, this contradicts Fact
12(iii), because ψ is SK-grounded.
For the opposite implication, assume that (N, TWK) |= T (ψ). Then by
Fact 12(i) we have: (N, T SK) |= T (ψ) and so (N, T ) |= T (ψ) by Fact 12(ii).
From the definition of T , it immediately follows that (N, TWK) |= τ(ψ) as
required. 
11Both here and elsewhere in such contexts we tacitly assume the sameness of coding in
the Weak Kleene and the Strong Kleene model.
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4 Statement of the result. Main lemmas
In this section we state our principal theorem, formulate the main lemmas
and provide the proof of one of the two lemmas.
Theorem 14 (main theorem) There is no formula τ(x) ∈ LT such that
τ(x) is a truth predicate of KF in (N, TWK).
Since (N, TWK) |= WKF , it immediately follows that WKF does not define
the truth predicate of KF .
Theorem 14 will be obtained as a direct corollary from the two lemmas
listed below.
Lemma 15 There are no formulas τ(x) and G(x) ∈ LT such that τ(x) is a
KF truth predicate in (N, TWK) and for every ψ ∈ SentLT :
(a) ψ is WK-grounded iff (N, TWK) |= τ(G(ψ)),
(b) ψ is WK-ungrounded iff (N, TWK) |= τ(¬G(ψ)).
Lemma 16 If (N, TWK) defines a truth predicate of KF , then there are
formulas τ(x) and G(x) satisfying the conditions (a) and (b) from Lemma
15.
Observe that Theorem 14 follows trivially from the lemmas. We now
give the proof of Lemma 15. Lemma 16 will be proved in the sections to
follow.
Proof of Lemma 15. Assuming that the lemma is false, define:
Tr(x) := τ(x[G(t) ∧ T (t)/T (t)]).
In other words, Tr(x) is the formula stating that the result of formally sub-
stituting ‘G(t) ∧ T (t)’ for every occurrence of ‘T (t)’ in x satisfies τ .12
We now show that for every ψ ∈ SentLT , (N, T
WK) |= Tr(ψ) ≡ ψ,
which contradicts Tarski’s undefinability theorem, thus ending the proof.
The argument proceeds by induction on the complexity of ψ. Below we
consider only cases of ψ of the form T (t) or ¬T (t), since it is only here where
conditions (a) and (b) from Lemma 15 are crucially used.
For ψ = pT (t)q, our task is to demonstrate that:
12I use the word ‘formally’ in order to emphasise that the substitution is carried out in
the object language, not in the metalanguage.
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(N, TWK) |= τ(G(t) ∧ T (t)) ≡ T (t).
If val(t) is WK-ungrounded, then the above equivalence holds in (N, TWK)
because both sides of the equivalence are false. In other words, we have then:
(N, TWK) 2 T (t) and (N, TWK) 2 τ(G(t)∧T (t)). The fact that (N, TWK) 2
T (t) is obvious on the assumption that val(t) is WK-ungrounded, so for
the indirect proof let us assume that (N, TWK) |= τ(G(t) ∧ T (t)). Then
(N, TWK) |= τ(G(t)), which by condition (a) of the lemma implies that
val(t) is WK-grounded and in this way a contradiction is obtained.
On the other hand, if val(t) is WK-grounded, then the following condi-
tions are equivalent:
• (N, TWK) |= τ(G(t) ∧ T (t)),
• (N, TWK) |= τ(T (t)),
• (N, TWK) |= T (t).
The first equivalence holds by the assumption (a) of the lemma. For the
second equivalence, observe that if val(t) is WK-grounded, then T (t) is
also WK-grounded and so by Corollary 13 we have: (N, TWK) |= τ(T (t))
iff (N, TWK) |= T (T (t)), with the last condition being equivalent to
(N, TWK) |= T (t) by the axiom wkf12.
For ψ = p¬T (t)q, our task is to demonstrate that:
(N, TWK) |= τ
(
¬(G(t) ∧ T (t))
)
≡ ¬T (t).
If val(t) is WK-ungrounded, then the above equivalence holds in (N, TWK)
because both sides of the equivalence are true. In other words, we have then:
(N, TWK) |= ¬T (t) and (N, TWK) |= τ
(
¬(G(t) ∧ T (t))
)
. For the second
conjunct (the first one is obvious) observe that by the assumption (b) of
the lemma we will have then (N, TWK) |= τ(¬G(t)) and thus (N, TWK) |=
τ
(
¬(G(t) ∧ T (t))
)
because τ(x) is a KF truth predicate.
If val(t) is WK-grounded, then the following conditions are equivalent:
• (N, TWK) |= τ
(
¬(G(t) ∧ T (t))
)
,
• (N, TWK) |= τ(¬T (t)),
• (N, TWK) |= ¬T (t).
The first equivalence holds because by the assumption (b) of the lemma
(N, TWK) 2 τ(¬G(t)).13 With val(t) being WK-grounded, ‘¬T (t)’ is also
13The condition ‘(N, TWK) |= τ
(
¬(G(t) ∧ T (t))
)
’ implies that (N, TWK) |= τ
(
¬G(t)
)
or (N, TWK) |= τ
(
¬T (t)
)
. Since val(t) is WK-grounded, the first disjunct is excluded by
the assumption (b) of the lemma, hence (N, TWK) |= τ(¬T (t)).
11
WK-grounded, hence the second equivalence follows immediately from Corol-
lary 13. 
5 Proof of Lemma 16
For the proof of Lemma 16 some additional auxiliary notions and facts will
be needed. These are introduced below.
Definition 17
• x ⊳ y is an abbreviation of the following arithmetical formula:
SentLT (x) ∧ SentLT (y) ∧(
∃t ∈ Tmc(y = pT (t)q ∧ x = val(t))
∨ ∃ψ ∈ SentLT (y = p¬ψq ∧ x = ψ)
∨ ∃ϕ, ψ ∈ SentLT (y = pϕ ◦ ψq ∧ x = ϕ ∨ x = ϕ)
∨ ∃θ(x) ∈ Fm≤1T ∃t ∈ Tm
c∃v ∈ V ar(y = pQvθ(v)q ∧ x = pθ(t)q)
)
.
• ⊳∗ denotes the transitive closure of ⊳ (in other words, x ⊳∗ y iff there
is a path from y to x along the ⊳ relation),
• x E y iff x ⊳ y ∨ x = y; x E∗ y is defined in a similar manner.
• a sentence ψ ∈ LT is well-founded (wf in short) iff ⊳ is well-founded
on {x : x E∗ ψ}.
The expression ‘Fm≤1T ’ used in the above definitions denotes the set of for-
mulas of LT with at most one free variable. V ar is the set of variables.
Definition 18 For an arbitrary well-founded ψ, Ord(ψ) (the ordinal of ψ)
is defined in the following manner:
Ord(ψ) = sup{Ord(x) : x ⊳ ψ}.
Lemma 19 For every ψ ∈ SentLT , ψ is WK-grounded iff ψ is well-founded.
Proof. Both implications are proved by ordinal induction. For the impli-
cation from left to right, fix α and assume that ∀β < α∀ψ ∈ SentLT [ψ ∈
TWKβ → ψ is well-founded]. The claim then is that ∀ψ ∈ SentLT [ψ ∈ T
WK
α →
ψ is well-founded]. For α being a limit ordinal, the claim follows trivially from
the inductive assumption. For α of the form β+1, the claim is also easily ob-
tained by analysing cases from Definition 4. For example, if ψ = pQvϕ(v)q,
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then for every t ∈ Tmc, either ϕ(t) or ¬ϕ(t) belongs to TWKβ and so by the
inductive assumption for every t ∈ Tmc, ϕ(t) is well-founded, from which it
follows that Qvϕ(v) is well-founded.
In the proof of the opposite implication, we show that
∀α∀ψ ∈ SentLT [(ψ is wf ∧ Ord(ψ) = α)→ ψ is WK-grounded ].
Fixing α and assuming that this holds for every ψ such that Ord(ψ) < α,
take an arbitrary sentence ψ such that Ord(ψ) = α. If α = 0, then ψ is of
the form ‘s1 = s2’ or it has the form ‘T (t)’ where val(t) is not a sentence.
Then either ψ or ¬ψ belongs to TWK1 and thus ψ is WK-grounded. If α
is a limit ordinal, then ψ has the form Qvϕ(v) and since by the inductive
assumption all sentences of the form ϕ(t) are WK-grounded, it is easy
to observe that ψ is also WK-grounded. The case of α = β + 1 is also
straightforward and we leave it to the reader. 
The next lemma characterises the bounds for ordinals of sentences deter-
mined as true in the Weak Kleene hierarchy.
Lemma 20
(a) ∀ϕ ∈ SentLT ∀α
(
ϕ ∈ TWKα+1 \ T
WK
α → Ord(ϕ) ≥ α
)
.
(b) ∀ϕ ∈ SentLT ∀α > 0
(
ϕ ∈ TWKα → Ord(ϕ) < ω · α
)
.
Both (a) and (b) are proved by ordinal induction, with the bulk of the
proofs devoted to analysing cases.
Proof of (a). Assume that ∀β < α∀ϕ ∈ SentLT
(
ϕ ∈ TWKβ+1 \ T
WK
β →
Ord(ϕ) ≥ β
)
. Fix ϕ ∈ TWKα+1 such that ϕ /∈ T
WK
α . Our claim is that
Ord(ϕ) ≥ α. From now on, the proof proceeds by considering all possible
forms of ϕ. Below we discuss just two cases, leaving the rest of them to the
reader.
Case 1: ϕ is of the form ‘T (t)’. Since ϕ ∈ TWKα+1 , we have: val(t) ∈ T
WK
α .
Since ϕ /∈ TWKα , we have also: ∀β < α val(t) /∈ T
WK
β . Therefore α = 0 or
α is a successor number of the form β + 1 (no new sentences can be added
on limit levels). If α = 0, then obviously Ord(ϕ) ≥ α. If α = β + 1, then
we have: val(t) ∈ TWKβ+1 and val(t) /∈ T
WK
β , so by our inductive assumption
Ord(val(t)) ≥ β, hence Ord(T (t)) ≥ β + 1 as required.
Case 2: ϕ is of the form ‘∀xψ(x)’. Since ϕ ∈ TWKα+1 , we have: ∀t ∈
Tmc ψ(t) ∈ TWKα . We now consider two possibilities: either (i) there is a
constant term t such that ψ(t) ∈ TWKα and ψ(t) does not appear anywhere
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earlier in the hierarchy, or (ii) no such term exists. In the first case, α
is a successor ordinal of the form β + 1, so by the inductive assumption
Ord(ψ(t)) ≥ β, therefore Ord(ϕ) ≥ α and the proof is done. In the second
case α must be a limit ordinal.14 Then we obtain:
∀β < α∃γ > β
(
γ < α ∧ ∃t(ψ(t) ∈ TWKγ+1 ∧ ψ(t) /∈ T
WK
γ )
)
.
Otherwise, fixing β < α and assuming that γ with the above properties does
not exist, we would have: ∀t ∈ Tmcψ(t) ∈ TWKβ and thus ϕ ∈ T
WK
α , contrary
to the assumption of the proof.
By the inductive assumption, it now follows that:
∀β < α∃γ > β
(
γ < α ∧ ∃tOrd(ψ(t)) ≥ γ
)
.
In effect, sup{Ord(ψ(t)) : t ∈ Tmc} ≥ α and thus Ord(ϕ) ≥ α. 
Proof of (b). Our inductive assumption is that ∀β < α
(
β > 0 → ∀ϕ ∈
SentLT (ϕ ∈ T
WK
β → Ord(ϕ) < ω ·β)
)
. Now, assuming that α > 0 and fixing
ϕ ∈ TWKα , we claim that Ord(ϕ) < ω · α.
It is easy to observe that for every arithmetical sentence ψ (with no
occurrence of the truth predicate), Ord(ϕ) < ω. Moreover, if our fixed ϕ
belongs to TWK1 , then ϕ is either arithmetical or it is of the form ‘T (t)’ or
‘¬T (t)’. In all of these cases Ord(ϕ) < ω, hence if α = 1, then Ord(ϕ) < ω·α.
If α is a limit ordinal, the result follows trivially from the inductive as-
sumption. So assume that α = β + 1 with β > 0. From now on, the proof
proceeds by analysing all possible forms of ϕ. We will consider just two cases,
leaving the rest of them to the reader.
Case 1: ϕ is of the form ¬T (t). Then val(t) is not a sentence or ¬val(t) ∈
TWKβ . In the first case Ord(ϕ) = 1 and we are done. In the second case by the
inductive assumption, Ord(¬val(t)) < ω ·β, hence Ord(¬T (t)) < ω · (β+1).
Case 2: ϕ is of the form ∀xψ(x). Then for all t ∈ Tmc, ψ(t) ∈ TWKβ
and so by the inductive assumption ∀t ∈ Tmc Ord(ψ(t)) < ω · β. Since by
definition Ord(ϕ) = sup{Ord(ψ(t)) : t ∈ Tmc}, we have: Ord(ϕ) ≤ ω · β.
Therefore Ord(ϕ) < ω · (β + 1), which means that Ord(ϕ) < ω · α. 
Observation 21
(a) ∀s, s′[s ⊳∗ s′ → ∃s1(s1 ⊳ s
′ ∧ s E∗ s1)],
(b) ∀s∀α[Ord(s) = α→ ∀β < α∃s′ ⊳∗ s Ord(s′) = β].
14If α were equal to β + 1, then by (ii) we would have: ∀t ∈ Tmcψ(t) ∈ TWKβ and thus
ϕ ∈ TWKα , contrary to the main assumption of the proof.
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Proof. Part (a) follows directly from the definition of ⊳∗. For an indirect
proof of (b), assume that Ord(s) = α and let β < α be such that ¬∃s′ ⊳∗
s Ord(s′) = β. Choose the least ordinal γ such that γ > β and ∃s′ E∗
s Ord(s′) = γ (such an ordinal exists because α satisfies both conditions).
Fixing s′ such that Ord(s′) = γ, we obtain:
γ = sup{Ord(s′′ : s′′ ⊳ s′}.
Since γ > β, we have: γ 6= 0. We observe that γ cannot be a successor
number, because if γ = δ + 1, then δ ∈ {Ord(s′′) : s′′ ⊳ s′}, which
contradicts the choice of γ as the least ordinal with the stipulated property.
It follows that γ is a limit ordinal. Therefore there is an ordinal δ > γ and s′′
such that Ord(s′′) = δ and s′′ ⊳ s′, which again contradicts the choice of γ. 
The next two sections contain a proof by cases of Lemma 16. Assuming
that (N, TWK) defines a truth predicate of KF , we take into account the
possible closure ordinals of (N, TWK) (see Definition 6). By Theorem 7 there
are two possibilities: either this ordinal is smaller than ωCK1 or it is ω
CK
1 . It
transpires that in both cases Lemma 16 can be proved, although the means
used in the proofs are quite different.
5.1 Case 1: ClOrd(N,TWK) < ω
CK
1
The key observation is that in this case ordinals of well-founded sentences
can be restricted by a fixed number below ωCK1 .
Observation 22 ∃κ < ωCK1 ∀ψ ∈ SentLT
(
ψ is well-founded → Ord(ψ) <
κ
)
.
Proof. Let α be the closure ordinal of (N, TWK). Define κ as ω · α.
Since α < ωCK1 , so is κ. Let ψ be well-founded, so by Lemma 19 either ψ
or its negation belongs to TWKβ for some β < α. Then by Lemma 20(b),
Ord(ψ) < ω · β and thus Ord(ψ) < κ. 
The proof of Lemma 16 employs the following theorem.15
Theorem 23 (Kripke 1975) Let S be an arbitrary set of natural numbers.
The following conditions are equivalent:
• S is ∆11,
15For the original formulation of the theorem, see (Kripke, 1975, p. 715-716). For the
proof, see (Schindler, 2015, p. 108), Theorem 7.2.8.
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• there is a formula ϕ(x) ∈ LT such that ϕ(x) is total in (N, T
SK) and
S = {n : (N, T SK) |= T (ϕ(n))}.
In view of Theorem 23, it is enough to show that the set of WK-grounded
sentences (that is, the set of well-founded sentences) is ∆11.
Lemma 24 The set of sentences well-founded in (N, TWK) is ∆11.
Proof. The Π11 formulation is straightforward. For starters, define ‘X is
a path on y’ as the conjunction of the following four arithmetical formulas
with one second-order free variable:
• ∀x ∈ X∃a, b(b E∗ y ∧ x = (a, b))
• (0, y) ∈ X
• ∀a, b, a′, b′((a, b) ∈ X ∧ (a′, b′) ∈ X → b E∗ b′ ∨ b′ E∗ b)
• ∀a, b((a + 1, b) ∈ X → ∃c ⊳ b(a, c) ∈ X).
Then we can express the well-foundedness of an arbitrary ψ by means of the
following Π11 formula:
∀X [X is a path on ψ → ∃n∀x ∈ Xx < n].
For a Σ11 formulation, let κ be an ordinal smaller that ω
CK
1 whose existence
is guaranteed by Observation 22. Then the well-foundedness of an arbitrary
ψ can be expressed by means of the following Σ11 formula:
∃f∃α < κ
(
f is a surjection mapping {x : x E∗ ψ} onto
α ∧ ∀x, y E∗ ψ(x ⊳ y → f(x) < f(y))
)
.
Note that since κ < ωCK1 , we can treat the quantification over ordinals as
quantification over ordinal notations. 
Now we immediately obtain the proof of Lemma 16.
Proof of Lemma 16 Let τ(x) be a KF truth predicate in (N, TWK). By
Lemma 24 and Theorem 23, let G(x) be a formula total in (N, T SK) such that
the set of WK-grounded sentences can be characterised as {ψ : (N, T SK) |=
T (G(ψ))}. The totality condition means that for every t, the formula ‘G(t)’
is SK-grounded and so the conditions (a) and (b) of Lemma 16 follow easily
from Fact 12(ii) and (iii). 
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5.2 Case 2: ClOrd(N,TWK) = ω
CK
1
In this case, the reasoning from the previous subsection is clearly inapplica-
ble, since by Lemma 20(a) we cannot restrict the ordinals of well-founded
formulas by any ordinal below ωCK1 . In effect, our strategy here will be quite
different. Indeed, now the proof of Lemma 16 is based on the insight that
well-founded sentences form a structure which is complex enough to permit
us (in the presence of the KF truth predicate) to reconstruct in (N, TWK)
various Strong Kleene model-theoretic constructions, including the Kripkean
construction of the least fixed-point model.
Let us start by the following definition. Intuitively, the formula ‘ψ(s, x)’
defined below is designed to express that x is a sentence determined as true
at the ordinal level s of the Strong Kleene least fixed-point construction.
However, ultimately instead of ordinals we will be using the well-founded
sentences of LT .
Definition 25 Let ψ be the diagonal formula satisfying (provably in PAT)
the condition:
ψ(s, x) ≡ s ∈ SentLT ∧(
x ∈ SentLPA ∧ T (x)
∨ x = pT (t)q ∧ ∃s′ ⊳ sT (ψ(s′, val(t)))
∨ x = p¬T (t)q ∧
(
∃s′ ⊳ sT (ψ(s′,¬val(t))) ∨ ¬SentLT (val(t))
)
∨ x = p¬¬ϕq ∧ ∃s′ ⊳ sT (ψ(s′, ϕ))
∨ x = pϕ ◦ χq ∧ ∃s′s′′ ⊳ s
(
T (ψ(s′, ϕ)) ◦ T (ψ(s′′, χ))
)
∨ x = p¬(ϕ ◦ χ)q ∧ ∃s′s′′ ⊳ s
(
T (ψ(s′,¬ϕ)) ◦d T (ψ(s
′′,¬χ))
)
∨ x = pQvϕq ∧ ∃s′ ⊳ sQaT (ψ(s′, ϕ(a)))
∨ x = p¬Qvϕq ∧ ∃s′ ⊳ sQdaT (ψ(s
′,¬ϕ(a)))
)
In what follows we assume that τ(x) is aKF truth predicate in (N, TWK).
Denoting by ‘F (s, x)’ the formula on the right side of the biconditional in
Definition 25, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 26
• (N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s, x)) ≡ τ(F (s, x)),
• (N, TWK) |= τ(F (s, x)) ≡ F τ(s, x).
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The first part follows by Lemma 9, the second by Observation 10 and the
fact that ψ(s, x) is positive. In effect, when working in (N, TWK), we can
always move freely between ‘τ(ψ(s, x))’ and the result of substituting ‘τ(t)’
for all the occurrences of ‘T (t)’ in ‘F (s, x)’.
We write ‘s ∈ D’ (s is determined) as an abbreviation of ‘T (s) ∨ T (¬s)’.
We denote by ‘DWK ’ the set of WK-grounded sentences. Now we formulate
the following basic observation.
Observation 27 For every ϕ ∈ SentLPA, for every s ∈ D
WK
(
(N, TWK) |=
τ(ψ(s, ϕ)) iff ϕ ∈ Th(N)
)
.
Proof. For the implication from right to left, observe that since τ(x) is
a KF truth predicate, for any ϕ ∈ Th(N) we will have (N, TWK) |= ϕ ∈
SentLPA ∧ τ(ϕ). Then by Corollary 26 together with the definition of ψ(s, x)
it follows that (N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s, ϕ)).
For the opposite implication, let α be the least ordinal such that for
some s we have: Ord(s) = α, (N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s, ϕ)) but ϕ /∈ Th(N). By
considering all possible forms of the formula ϕ we note that there has to be
an s′ ⊳ s such that for some sentence χ /∈ Th(N) (N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s′, χ)).16
But then Ord(s′) < α, which contradicts the choice of α. 
The next lemma establishes the monotonicity of ψ under τ .
Lemma 28 ∀ss′ ∈ DWK
(
(Ord(s) ≤ Ord(s′)) → ∀ϕ ∈
SentLT
(
(N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s, ϕ))→ (N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s′, ϕ))
))
.
Proof. Fix an ordinal α and assume that the lemma is true below α, that
is:
∀γ < α∀ss′ ∈ DWK
(
(Ord(s) ≤ γ ∧ Ord(s′) = γ)→
∀ϕ ∈ SentLT
(
(N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s, ϕ)) → (N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s′, ϕ))
))
.
We claim that ∀ss′ ∈ DWK
(
(Ord(s) ≤ α ∧ Ord(s′) = α) → ∀ϕ ∈
SentLT
(
(N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s, ϕ))→ (N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s′, ϕ))
))
.
Fix s and s′ ∈ DWK such that Ord(s) ≤ α and Ord(s′) = α. Assum-
ing that (N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s, ϕ)), we are going to show that (N, TWK) |=
τ(ψ(s′, ϕ)). The proof proceeds by considering cases. For illustration we
16It is easy to observe that ϕ cannot have the form ‘t = s’, therefore ϕ has to be of the
form ¬¬χ, ξ ◦ χ, ¬(ξ ◦ χ), Qvχ or ¬Qvχ.
18
present below three of them; the reasoning in the remaining cases is very
similar.
Case 1: ϕ ∈ SentLPA . Then the conclusion follows by Observation 27.
Case 2: ϕ = (¬)T (t). Then (N, TWK) |= ∃s1 ⊳ s τ(ψ(s1, (¬)val(t))).
Fixing such an s1, we observe that Ord(s1) < α. By Observation 21(b),
choose s2 ⊳
∗ s′ such that Ord(s2) = Ord(s1). Then by the inductive as-
sumption we obtain (N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s2, (¬)val(t))). By Observation 21(a),
choose s3 ⊳ s
′ such that s2 E
∗ s3. Then again by the inductive assumption
we obtain (N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s3, (¬)val(t))). Since s3 ⊳ s
′, we finally obtain
(N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s′, (¬)T (t))) by the definition of ψ.
Case 3: ϕ = Qvχ. Then (N, TWK) |= ∃s1 ⊳
∗ s Qa τ(ψ(s1, χ(a))). Fix
such an s1. Applying Observation 21, choose s2 and s3 such that Ord(s2) =
Ord(s1), s2 ⊳
∗ s′, s2 E
∗ s3, s3 ⊳ s
′. By the inductive assumption we obtain:
(N, TWK) |= Qa τ(ψ(s2, χ(a))),
(N, TWK) |= Qa τ(ψ(s3, χ(a))).
Since s3 ⊳ s
′, we obtain (N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s′, Qvχ)) by the definition of ψ.

The lemma below establishes a connection between the behaviour of ψ
under τ and Kripke’s hierarchy from Definition 5.
Lemma 29 ∀s∀α[Ord(s) = α → ∀ϕ ∈ SentLT
(
ϕ ∈ T SKα ≡ (N, T
WK) |=
τ(ψ(s, ϕ))
)
].
Proof. Assume that ∀β < α∀s[Ord(s) = β → ∀ϕ ∈ SentLT
(
ϕ ∈ T SKβ ≡
(N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s, ϕ))
)
]. We claim that the same holds also for α.
If α = Ord(s) = 0, then ϕ ∈ T SKα iff (N, T
WK) |= τ(ψ(s, ϕ)) iff ϕ ∈
Th(N). If α = β + 1, the proof proceeds by analysing possible forms of ϕ.
Thus, e.g.:
Case 1. ϕ = T (t). Assuming that ϕ ∈ T SKβ+1, we obtain: val(t) ∈ T
SK
β .
Let s′ ⊳ s be such that Ord(s′) = β. Then by the inductive assumption
we have (N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s′, ϕ)) and therefore (N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s, ϕ)). The
proof of the opposite implication is very similar.
Case 2. ϕ = Qvχ(v). Assuming that ϕ ∈ T SKβ+1, we obtain: Qa(χ(a) ∈
T SKβ ). As before, choosing s
′ ⊳ s such that Ord(s′) = β we obtain:
(N, TWK) |= Qaτ(ψ(s′, χ(a))) and therefore (N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s′, Qvχ(v))).
Again, the proof of the opposite implication is very similar. We leave the
other cases to the reader.
If α is a limit ordinal, we argue as follows. Assuming that ϕ ∈ T SKα , take
β < α such that ϕ ∈ T SKβ . By Observation 21(b), take s
′ ⊳∗ s such that
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Ord(s′) = β. Then by the inductive assumption (N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s′, ϕ)) and
therefore by Lemma 28 (N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s, ϕ)). For the opposite implication,
assuming that (N, TWK) |= τ(ψ(s, ϕ)), we consider possible forms of ϕ.17
The proof then proceeds by cases. Since the argument in each case is very
similar, we restrict ourselves to giving one example, leaving the rest for the
reader to verify.
Thus, assume that ϕ = ¬T (t). Then (N, TWK) |= ¬SentLT (val(t)) ∨
∃s′ ⊳ s τ(ψ(s′,¬val(t))). If the first disjunct holds, it follows immediately
that ϕ ∈ T SKα . If the second, choose an s
′ with the indicated property and
let Ord(s′) = β. Since β < α, by the inductive assumption we obtain:
¬val(t) ∈ T SKβ and since α is a limit ordinal, we can take an ordinal γ and
an s′′ ⊳ s such that Ord(s′′) = γ, γ > β and γ < α. Then ¬T (t) ∈ T SKγ and
thus ¬T (t) ∈ T SKα . 
Corollary 30 If τ(x) is an arbitrary KF truth predicate in (N, TWK), then
there is a formula τ ′(x) ∈ LT which defines in (N, T
WK) the set of sentences
determined as true in the least fixed point model of KF .
Proof. Define τ ′(x) as ‘∃s ∈ D τ(ψ(s, x))’. The result follows immediately
from Lemma 29 and the observation that the ordinals of elements of DWK
are arbitrarily large below ωCK1 . 
For the proof of Lemma 16, we assume that we have at our disposal
a KF truth predicate. Our task is to show the existence of a KF truth
predicate which can ‘recognize’ Weak Kleene groundedness in the sense of
conditions (a) and (b) of Lemma 15. For this we need to define a formula
G(x) expressing groundedness. We introduce such a formula below.
Definition 31 Let ϕ(x, y) be defined as ∃z ⊳ x∃s
(
s = sub(y, pxq, z)∧T (s)
)
.
Define θ(x) as the diagonal formula for ϕ(x, y) (for the details of the con-
struction, see Definition 8).
In particular, PAT proves that:
θ(x) ≡ ∃z ⊳ x T (θ(z)).
Now, our G(x) is defined as ¬θ(x). Let us start with the following observa-
tion.
17Namely, we may assume that ϕ has one of the forms T (t), ¬T (t), ¬¬χ, χ ◦ ξ, ¬(χ ◦ ξ),
Qvχ(v) or ¬Qvχ(v).
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Observation 32 For every ψ ∈ SentLT , if ψ is WK-grounded, then
(N, T SK) |= T (¬θ(ψ)).
Proof. The proof proceeds by ordinal induction. Assume that for every
β < α and for every ψ ∈ SentLT , if ψ is WK-grounded and Ord(ψ) = β,
then (N, T SK) |= T (¬θ(ψ)). Let ψ be WK-grounded such that Ord(ψ) = α.
We claim that (N, T SK) |= T (¬θ(ψ)).
By Lemma 9(b), it is enough to demonstrate that (N, T SK) |= T (¬∃z ⊳
ψ T (θ(z))), which in turn is equivalent in (N, T SK) to ‘∀z
(
z ⊳ ψ →
T (¬θ(z))
)
’.
Fixing z ⊳ ψ, we notice that z is WK-grounded and Ord(z) < α.
Therefore by the inductive assumption (N, T SK) |= T (¬θ(z)) and thus the
proof is finished. 
At this moment we see that already the least fixed-point model of KF is
able to recognize Weak Kleene groundedness, but only in a restricted sense:
if the sentence ψ is WK-grounded, then the model will classify G(ψ) - that is,
¬θ(ψ) - as determinately true. However, in case of ψ being WK-ungrounded,
the least fixed-point model of KF is not able to recognize G(ψ) as determi-
nately false. In effect, the condition (b) from Lemma 15 is still not satisfied.
Below we are going to show how to remedy this defect. Let us start with the
following definition.
Definition 33
• T θ0 = Th(N) ∪ {θ(t) : t ∈ Tm
c ∧ val(t) is WK-ungrounded},
• T θα+1 = J
SK(T θα) ∪ {θ(t) : t ∈ Tm
c ∧ val(t) is WK-ungrounded},
• T θλ =
⋃
α<λ
T θα,
• T θ is T θκ for the least κ such that T
θ
κ = T
θ
κ+1.
The definition closely resembles the usual construction of the Strong
Kleene fixed-point model. The only difference is that we explicitly add the
information that for all WK-ungrounded sentences ψ, θ(ψ) (in other words,
¬G(ψ)) will belong to the interpretation of the truth predicate. Note that
for technical reasons, the set {θ(t) : t ∈ Tmc ∧ val(t) is WK-ungrounded}
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is added in the definition also at successor levels. This is done in order to
guarantee the full monotonicity of the construction.18
The properties of T θ are encapsulated in the following observation.
Observation 34 (N, T θ) |= KF and for every ψ ∈ SentLT :
(a) ψ is WK-grounded iff (N, T θ) |= T (¬θ(ψ)),
(b) ψ is WK-ungrounded iff (N, T θ) |= T (θ(ψ)).
In view of Observation 34, in the proof of Lemma 16 it is enough to
demonstrate that if (N, TWK) defines a truth predicate of KF , then it
defines also T θ.
Proof of Lemma 16 Assume that (N, TWK) defines a truth predicate of
KF . By Corollary 30, let τ(x) be a formula defining in (N, TWK) the set of
sentences determined as true in the least fixed-point model of KF .
Define:
τCompl(x) := ¬τ(¬x).
Then τCompl(x) defines in (N, TWK) the set of sentences determined as
true in the largest fixed-point model of KF .19 Observe that in the largest
fixed-point model (N, TCompl) of KF , all sentences ¬θ(t) for val(t) being
WK-grounded will belong to TCompl (this is because by Observation 32 they
belong already to T SK); moreover, in such cases by Fact 12(iii) θ(t) does not
belong to TCompl. On the other hand, if val(t) is not WK-grounded, then
both θ(t) and ¬θ(t) belongs to TCompl.
18Defining T θα+1 as J
SK(T θα) would bring a minor technical compli-
cation: given that θ(t) ∈ T θ0 , why should it belong also to T
θ
1 ?
As defined earlier (cf. Definitions 31 and 8), θ(t) is the formula:
∃ab[a = name(m) ∧ b = sub(m, pyq, a) ∧ ∃z ⊳ t∃s
(
s = sub(b, pxq, z)∧ T (s)
)
].
Clearly, already T θ0 will contain witnessing statements (with fixed a, b, z and s) for the
arithmetical part of this existential formula. In other words, in T θ0 we will have (for fixed
a, b, z and s) a = name(m) ∧ b = sub(m, pyq, a) ∧ z ⊳ t ∧ s = sub(b, pxq, z), with s also
belonging to T θ0 and identical to θ(z). However, this in itself is not enough to guarantee
that the Strong Kleene jump applied to T θ0 will produce θ(t).
19This has been observed in a more general form by Cantini (1989). Let Con be the
statement ‘∀ψ¬
(
T (ψ) ∧ T (¬ψ)
)
’ and let Compl be the statement ‘∀ψ
(
T (ψ) ∨ T (¬ψ)
)
’.
The general observation is that given a model (N, T ) of KF+Con, a model (N, T ′) of
KF+Compl can be obtained by defining T ′ as the set of those sentences of LT whose
negations do not belong to T .
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Copying the idea from Definition 25, let ψ1 be the diagonal formula sat-
isfying the following condition:
ψ1(s, x) ≡ x ∈ SentLPA ∧ T (x)
∨ x = pθ(t)q ∧ T (θ(t))
∨ x = pT (t)q ∧ ∃s′ ⊳ sT (ψ1(s
′, val(t)))
∨ x = p¬T (t)q ∧
(
∃s′ ⊳ sT (ψ1(s
′,¬val(t))) ∨ ¬SentLT (val(t))
)
∨ x = p¬¬ϕq ∧ ∃s′ ⊳ sT (ψ1(s
′, ϕ))
∨ x = pϕ ◦ χq ∧ ∃s′s′′ ⊳ s
(
T (ψ1(s
′, ϕ)) ◦ T (ψ1(s
′′, χ))
)
∨ x = p¬(ϕ ◦ χ)q ∧ ∃s′s′′ ⊳ s
(
T (ψ1(s
′,¬ϕ)) ◦d T (ψ1(s
′′,¬χ))
)
∨ x = pQvϕq ∧ ∃s′ ⊳ sQaT (ψ1(s
′, ϕ(a)))
∨ x = p¬Qvϕq ∧ ∃s′ ⊳ sQdaT (ψ1(s
′,¬ϕ(a)))
Finally, we define:
τ θ(x) := ∃s
(
D(s) ∧ τCompl(ψ1(s, x))
)
.
Arguing exactly as in the proof of Lemma 29, we prove that τ θ(x) defines T θ
in (N, TWK). 
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